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WHAT ARE THE PROPER GROUNDS FOR
GRANTING ANNULMENTS?
ROBERT KiNrGLEY*
Fundamentally, the law of annulment is a specialized branch of the law of
rescission of contracts. Without here entering into any debatement over whether
or not marriage is only a civil contract,1 it is clear that it is a status' which is created
by contract; and it is also true that, in broad terms, the requisites of marriage are
those of any civil contract-that is, there must be parties capable of contracting, who
must evidence their consent in an appropriate manner. It is, of course, to the law
of marriage, rather than to the law of annulment, that we turn for the answers to
many of the fundamental problems that face us, for it is that law which decrees who
is capable of contracting marriage, and it is that law which decrees the formalities by
which consent must be evidenced.
The several standard grounds for annulment (without now distinguishing be-
tween annulment of voidable marriages and declaratory decrees of nullity of void
marriages) fall into two groups: (i) Those concerned with the existence and
manifestation of consent, and (2) those concerned with the personal capability for
marriage of the parties.
I
CONSENT TO MARRY
In order to have a valid marriage: (i) the parties must intend to enter into
the marriage status; and (2) their intent to be married must have been acquired,
and must exist, as a "voluntary" state of mind.
While the cases of Error, Mistake, and Jest are individually interesting, and while
the courts have shown some difficulty in analysis of border-line situations, still the
chief problem in connection with the existence of an intent to marry has been in
those cases where the ability to form such an intent was in question-i., cases
of so-called "Insanity" and of Intoxication.
In determining whether or not a party to a marriage ceremony was mentally corn-
*A.B. and A.M. x923, LL.B. 1926, University of Minnesota; S.J.D. 1928, Harvard University. Dean,
School of Law, University of Southern California. Author of sundry articles on Domestic Relations.
'Cf. Editorial, 23 CENT. L. J. 289 (1886); Gatto v. Gatto, 79 N. H. 177, io6 Ad. 493 (99);
Ex parte Suzanna, 295 Fed. 713, 714-715 (D. Mass. 1924); State v. Fry, 4 Mo. 120, i8o-i87 (1835).
"Consult Note, 2 Ax. L. J. 266 (1927).
' Compare the varying results reached in: Crouch v. Wartenberg, 86 V. Va. 664, 104 S.E. 117 (1920),
91 W. Va. 91, 112 S.E. 234 (1922), discussed in Notes, 29 W. VA. L. Q. 6o (1922) and 21 COL. L. REv.
194 (1921); Stone v. Stone, 159 Fla. 624, 32 So. 2d 278 (1947), noted in 19 U. oF Prrr. L. REv. 277
(1948); Schibi v. Schibi, 136 Conn. 196, 69 A. 2d 831 (1949), discussed in Note, 31 ORE. L. Rv.
256 (1952); United States v. Rubenstein, x~i F. 2d 174 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Lutwak, 195
F. 2d 748 (7th Cir. 1952).
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petent to give a legally binding consent to become married, the courts have used a
wide variety of language. A few courts have said that the issue was whether or
not the party was mentally capable of entering into an ordinary commercial con-
tract;4 but the later cases have held that there is no necessary connection between
the capacity to make commercial contracts and the capacity to become married.
The test today is usually put as requiring the mental ability to "understand the
nature of the marriage relation and the duties and obligations involved therein."'
So put, it is clear that the capacity to enter into business relations has no bearing
4Inhab. of Atkinson v. Inhab. of Medford, 46 Me. 510 (1859); Inhab. of Middleborough v. Inhab.
of Rochester, 12 Mass. (12 Tyng) 363 (x815); Anonymous, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 32 (1826); Cole v.
Cole, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 57, 7o Am. Dec. 275 (1857); see: Sibley v. Kennedy, 224 Ala. 354, x40 So.
552 (1932); Dunphy v. Dunphy, 16x Cal. 380, 119 Pac. 512 (1911), discussed in Note, io Miesn. L. Rv.
500 (1912).
"Perhaps the same degree of mental strength is not required as is essential in the transaction of
business, involving the exercise of judgment, reason, and experience sufficient to enable the party to
compete with an antagonist designing to obtain an advantage and to protect his own interests, yet he
must be capable of entering understandingly into the relation of marriage." Hagenson v. Hagenson, 258
Ill. 197, 199, 101 N.E. 6o6, 607 (1913).
"... the same mental strength necessary to the transaction of business is not necessary to enable
the party to contract a marriage, though he must be capable of understanding the nature of the act. . .
Flynn v. Troesch, 373 I11 275, 292-293, 26 N.E. 2d 95, 99 (1940).
Accord: Johnson v. Johnson, 214 Minn. 462, 8 N.W. 2d 62o (943); Payne v. Burdette, 84 Mo.
App. 332 (1900) (holding that adjudication of insanity in a lunacy proceeding was not conclusive
on the issue of capacity to marry); McCleary v. Barcalow, 6 Ohio C.C. 481, 3 Ohio Dec. 547 (1891)
(semble); Ross v. Ross, 175 Okla. 663, 54 P. 2d 611 (1936); Ex parte Chace, 26 R.I. 351, 58 At. 978
(1904); Roether v. Roether, 18o Wis. 24, x91 N. W. 576 (1923); see: Imhoff v. Witmer's Adm'r, 31 Pa.
St. (7 Casey) 243 (z858).
a . . we take it that the question of what is an unsound mind must, in cases of this character,
be determined by the same tests which are applied in any case where it is sought to set aside the
contract or other act of the person alleged to be insane. It is universally held that a variation from
a normal mental condition is not in itself enough to avoid every act. The mental defect or derangement
must be one having a direct bearing upon the particular act which is brought in question." Dunphy v.
Dunphy, i61 Cal. 380, 383, i19 Pac. 512, 513 (xgix) (italics added). "A marriage contract will be
invalidated by the want of consent of capable persons. It requires the mutual consent of two persons
of sound mind, and if at the time a marriage ceremony is performed one of the parties is mentally in-
capable of giving an intelligent consent to what is done, with an understanding of the obligations
assumed, the solemnization is a mere idle ceremony, conferring no right and leaving the status of each
party unchanged." Hagenson v. Hagenson, 258 Ill. 197, 198-i99, i10 N.E. 6o6, 607 (1913) (italics
added).
Accord: McClure v. Donovan, 86 Cal. App. 2d 747, 195 P. 2d 9o1 (1948); Elzey v. Elzey, i Houst.
308 (Del. 1857); Pyott v. Pyott, 191 Il1. 280, 61 N.E. 88 (i9oi); Gellert v. Busman's Adm'r, 239 Ky.
328, 39 S. W. 2d 511 (1931); Inhab. of St. George v. City of Biddeford, 76 Me. 593 (1885); Mont-
gomery v. U'Nertle, 143 Md. 200, 122 At. 357 (1923), discussed in Note, 8 MiNN. L. Rav. 169 (1924);
Elfont v. Elfont, 161 Md. 458, 157 Ad. 741 (932); Van Haaften v. Van Haaften, 139 Mich. 479, 102
N. W. 989 (1905); Lewis v. Lewis, 44 Minn. 124, 46 N. W. 323 (189o); Ward v. Dulaney, 23 Miss.
410 (1852); Chapline v. Stone, 77 Mo. App. 523 (1898); Guthery v. Ball, 2o6 Mo. App. 570, 228 S. W.
887 (1921); Westermayer v. Westermayer, 216 Mo. App. 74, 267 S. W. 24 (1924); Murphy v. La
Chapelle, 95 Mont. 36, 24 P. 2d 131 (i933); Kutch v. Kutch, 88 Neb. 114, 129 N. W. 169 (191o);
Svanda v. Svanda, 93 Neb. 404, 14o N. W. 777 (1913); McNee v. McNee, 49 Nev. 90, 237 Pac. 534
(x925); True v. Ranney, 21 N. H. 52, 53 Am. Dec. 164 (x850); Kern v. Kern, 5i N. J. Eq. 574, 26
At. 837 (1893); Buffum v. Buffum, 86 N. J. Eq. 119, 97 Ad. 256 (1916); Meekins v. Kinsella, 152
App. Div. 32, 136 N.Y.S. 8o6 (ist Dep't 1912); Kemmelick v. Kemmelick, 114 Misc. 198, 186 N. Y. S.
3 (Sup. Ct. 1921); Ross v. Ross, 175 Okla. 663, 54 P.2d 61i (1936); Dc la Montanya v. De la
Montanya, 131 Ore. 23, 281 Pac. 825 (x929); Schneider v. Rabb, 1oo S. W. 163 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907);
Hempel v. Hempel, 174 Wis. 332, r8x N. W. 749 (1921). In Bloom v. Bloom, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 890
(Sup. Ct. 1947), a complaint alleging that the wife was afflicted with a mental infirmity or disorder, as
a result of which she "could not fully discharge her marital duties or functions," was dismissed as
stating only conclusions of law.
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on the capacity to marry. It is familiar law in all matters involving mental incom-
petency that the mind's capacity must be judged with reference to the particular
act involved: capacity to make a will, capacity to commit a crime, capacity to buy
and sell--each involves a different quality and degree of mental keenness. 7 So, here,
the ability to think with sufficient clearness about marriage may or may not ac-
company the capacity to think clearly about other contracts.
As a matter of public policy, as well as of legal analogy, a different, and perhaps
less severe, test seems to be called for in the marriage cases. In matters involving
ordinary commercial dealings, the incompetent may achieve the ultimate benefits by
virtue of the intervention of a guardian; but a guardian cannot contract a marriage
for his ward. Hence one under guardianship must either stay single, or be allowed
to marry in spite of his inability to engage in business. For the numerically con-
siderable group of mentally weak persons, whose estates are controlled by guardians
but who are permitted to go at large in the community, a legal prohibition on mar-
riage would simply result in fornication, temporary liaisons, and similar socially un-
desirable practices. Consequently, the law wisely has permitted such persons to
marry if it appeared that, concerning that particular kind of relationship, they had
a reasonably intelligent attitude
Further, merely to state in words a "test" of mental capacity is by no means to
solve the problem. In the first place, it must be remembered that this issue is one of
capacity to have the proper understanding; hence mere lack of appreciation of the
nature of marriage, arising from youth or ignorance, will not affect the marriage
Further, to understand the nature of marriage and its duties and responsibilities is
a problem that has taxed the abilities of generations of able scholars; clearly, then,
we expect here only a minimum of appreciation of those matters in their most
general aspects.Y0 The result is to leave each case to be decided very much on its
own facts, with the decision of the trier of the facts largely controllingYl
7On this point, in addition to the holdings in the cases cited in the preceeding footnotes, consult
the excellent analysis in Kern v. Kern, 5 N. J. Eq. 574, 26 Ad. 837 (1893); and consult Note, 14
ST. Lotns L. RaV. 422 (1929).
8 "If the powers of his mind had been so far affected by disease or the decay of his faculties as
to render him incapable of knowing the effect of the act he was about to perform, and of intelligently
consenting to the ceremony, then there was an incapacity on his part to contract. On the other hand,
even if his understanding was weak, still, if his capacity remained to see things at the time in their true
relations, and to form correct conclusions, the contract of marriage would be valid.... Baughman
v. Baughman, 32 Kan. 538, 545, 4 Pac. 1003, 1007 (1884). Accord: Johnson v. Johnson, 214 Minn.
462, 8 N. W. 2d 620 (943).
'Green v. Green, 77 Fla. 101, 8o So. 739 (1919); Adams v. Scott, 93 Neb. 537, 141 N. W. 148
(1913).
"" 'He need not have understood all the duties, obligations and responsibilities which the marriage
relation imposed upon him, because that rule would probably render void many marriages in this
state . . . But he should have had at the time sufficient mental capacity to enable him to understand
the nature of the marriage relation, the nature of the marriage contract, and to understand that upon
himself he took with it all the duties, obligations and responsibilities which the law would impose
upon him as a result of that contract on his part, whatever they were." Inhab. of St. George v.
City of Biddeford, 76 Me. 593, 597 (1885) (italics supplied).
And see Kern v. Kern, 51 N. J. Eq. 574, 26 Ad. 837 (893).
"
1 For the reasons stated in the text, only a detailed examination of each case will show what
conduct and condition is likely to affect the judgment of a court. There is here given a selective list
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In a few cases, marriage has been attacked on the ground that the party was,
at the time of the ceremony, under the influence of drugs or liquor. If the effect
of such intoxicants was to make the person unconscious of what was going on, no
marriage resulted, since there was not even an appearance of assent.12  But if intoxi-
cation had not proceeded that far, then the courts have treated it as merely a special
of cases in which such evidentiary matters have been sufficiently discussed to make them helpful as
guides in future litigation.
Insuffliient capacity: Dunphy v. Dunphy, 161 Cal. 380, 119 Pac. 512 (s911) (weakness of mind
coupled with habitual intoxication); Orchardson v. Cofield, 171 Ill. 14, 49 N. E. 197 (1897) (weakness of
mind, extreme belief in spiritualism, and fraud); Pyott v. Pyott, 191 Ill. 280, 61 N. E. 88 (isox);
Chapline v. Stone, 77 Mo. App. 523 (1898); Guthery v. Ball, 206 Mo. App. 570, 228 S. W. 887
(1921) (but cf., involving the same marriage, Guthery v. Wetzel, 205 Mo. App. 664, 226 S. W. 626
(1920)); Westermayer v. Westermayer, 216 Mo. App. 74, 267 S. W. 24 (1924); McNee v. McNee, 49
Nev. 90, 237 Pac. 534 (1925); True v. Ranney, 21 N. H. 52, 53 Am. Dec. 164 (850); Buffum v.
Buffum, 86 N. J. Eq. 119, 97 Ad. 256 (1916); Jaques v. The Public Adm'r, 1 Bradf. 499 (N. Y.
1851) (death bed marriage); Whitney v. Whitney, 121 Misc. 485, 201 N. Y. S. 227 (Sup. Ct. 1923),
discussed in Notes, 33 YALE L. J. 334 (1924) and 24 COL. L. REv. 95 (1924) (incurable dementia
praecox); Crump v. Morgan, 38 N. C. (3 Ired. Eq.) 91, 40 Am. Dec. 447 (1843) (total lunacy);
Goodheart v. Ransley, Ii Ohio Dec. Rep. 655, 28 Wx.y. LAw Bn.. 227 (1892) (where there had
been adjudication of insanity, though the evidence seems to show that party knew he was being married
and understood at least the physical rights and obligations)); Foster, Adm'r v. Means, x Speers' Eq. 569,
42 Am. Dec. 332 (S. C. x844) (lack of reasoning powers); Counts v. Counts, 161 Va. 768, 172 S. E.
248 (1934).
Sufflcient capacity: Smith v. Smith, 141 Ala. 590, 37 So. 638 (1904); Hagenson v. Hagenson, 258
Ill- 197, 1o1 N. E. 6o6 (1913); Flynn v. Troesch, 373 Ill. 275, 26 N. E. 2d 91 (1940) (arterio-
sclerosis); Baughman v. Baughman, 32 Kan. 538, 4 Pac. 1003 (1884) (brain paralysis); Gellert v.
Busman's Adm'r, 239 Ky. 328, 39 S. W. 2d 511 (93) (previous adjudication of insanity, but party
had been successfully employed and happily married until her death); Elfont v. Elfont, 161 Md. 458,
157 Ad. 741 (1932) (party was drawing government compensation for dementia praccox); Anonymous,
21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 32 (1826) ("the fact of a party's being able to go through the marriage ceremony
'with propriety was prima fade evidence of sufficient understanding to make the contract"); Van Haaften
v. Van Haaften, 139 Mich. 479, 12 N. WV. 989 (ipo5) (delusions that party was visited by personal devils
and by angels); Lewis v. Lewis, 44 Minn. 124, 46 N. 'W. 323 (189o) (kleptomania); Ward v. Du.
laney, 23 Miss. 410 (1852) (hysteria); Powell v. Powell, 27 Miss. 783 (1854); Smith v. Smith, 47 Miss.
21i (x872); Wilson v. Wilson, 104 Miss. 347, 6i So. 453 (1913); Payne v. Burdette, '84 Mo. App. 332
(i9oo) (prior adjudication of insanity); Henderson v. Henderson, 141 Mo. App. 540, 126 S. W. 203
(19io); Henderson v. Ressor, 265 Mo. 718, 178 S. 'W. 175 (1915) writ of error dismissed, 248 U. S.
536 (i918); Guthery v. Wetzel, 205 Mo. App. 664, 226 S. W. 626 (1920) (but Cf. Guthery v. Ball,
2o6 Mo. App. 570, 228 S. W. 887 (1921), involving the same marriage); Murphy v. LaChappelle,
95 Mont. 36, 24 P. 2d 131 (i933); Kutch v. Kutch, 88 Neb. 114, 129 N. V. 169 (I91o); Svanda v.
Svanda, 93 Neb. 404, 14o N.W. 777 (1913); Kern v. Kern, 51 N. J. Eq. 574, 26 Ad. 837 (1893);
Brainen v. Brainen, 79 N. J. Eq. 270, 82 Ad. 327 (1912) (party had been released as cured from a
sanitarium for mental cases); Banker v. Banker, 63 N. Y. 409 (1875); Meekins v. Kinsella, 152 App.
Div. 32, 136 N. Y. S. 8o6 (ist Dep't 1912) (paranoia); Kemmelick v. Kemmelick, 114 Misc. 198, 186
N. Y. S. 3 (Sup. Ct. i92i) (delusions); Weinberg v. Weinberg, 255 App. Div. 366, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 341
(4 th Dep't 1938); McCleary v. Barcalow, 6 Ohio C. C. 481, 3 Ohio Dec. 547 (1891) (guardianship);
Ross v. Ross, 175 Okla. 663, 54 P. 2d 611 (1936) (semble); Coleman v. Coleman, 85 Ore. 99, 166
Pac. 47 (1917); De la Montanya v. Dc al Montanya, 131 Ore. 23, 281 Pac. 825 (1929); Clement v.
Mattison, 37 S. C. L. (3 Rich. L.) 93 (1846); Cole v. Cole, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 57, 70 Am. Dec. 275
(1857); Hempel v. Hempel, 174 Wis. 332, 181 N. W. 749 (1921) (wcakmindedness); Roether v.
Roether, 180 Wis. 24, 191 N. W. 576 (1923) (guardianship); Kuehne v. Kuehne, x85 Wis. 195, 201
N. W. 506 (1924) (excessive jealousy).
" Hamlet v. Hamlet, 242 Ala. 70, 4 So. 2d 9o (1941); Baxter v. Rogers, 195 Ga. 274, 24 S. E. 2d
52 (1943); Martin v. Martin, 151 Fla. 676, 26 So. 2d 901 (1946); Montgomery v. U'Nertle, 143 Md.
200, 122 Ad. 357 (1923); Gillett v. Gillett, 78 Mich. 184, 43 N. XV. 11o1 (x889); Sloane v. Kane & Grant,
io How. Pract. 66 (N. Y. 1854); see Elzey v. Elzey, i Houst. 308 (Del. 1857); Prine v. Prine, 36 Fla.
676, IS So. 781 (1895); Barber v. People, 203 Ill 543, 68 N. E. 93 (1903); Waughop v. Waughop, 82
Wash. 69, 143 Pac. 444 (1914).
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manifestation of mental incompetency, to be judged by the same tests. In other
words, if the intoxication had rendered the party, for the time, incapable of under-
standing the nature of the relation into which he purported to enter, or of appreci-
ating its duties and responsibilities, then a valid marriage had not resulted; but if
his incapacity fell short of that standard, the marriage was not open to attack.1
3
Of course, the fact of intoxication may have an evidentiary value in determining
whether alleged fraud or duress actually operated on a particular person.
Two obstacles stand in the way of one who would attack a marriage on the
ground of the mental incapacity of one party thereto: There is a general presumption
of sanity;' 4 and there is an even stronger presumption in favor of the validity of any
marriage whose status is questioned.' Hence, the burden of proof on the issue of
mental capacity is on whichever party to the litigation seeks to attack the marriage,' 6
and this burden must be maintained by clear and convincing proof before a court
will rule against validity of the marriage.'
7
Since lack of mental capacity affects marriage only in so far as it negatives the
existence of an intent to become married,'" it follows that only the condition at the
time of the ceremony is important. 9 Hence, an adjudication of insanity after the
marriage raises no presumption of invalidity,20 though, under the rules of evidence
"
5 Dunphy v. Dunphy, 161 Cal. 380, "ig Pac. 512 (1911), discussed in Note, xo MICH. L. Rav. 500
(1912); Elzey v. Elzey, I Houst. 3o8 (Del. 1857); Prine v. Prine, 36 Fla. 676, 18 So. 78! (1895);
Barber v. People, 203 I11 543, 68 N. E. 93 (igo3); Montgomery v. U'Nertle, 143 Md. 200, 122 Ad.
357 (X923), discussed in Note, 8 MINN. L. REv. 169 (1924); McNee v. McNee, 49 Nev. 90, 237 Pac.
534 (1925); Selah v. Selah, 23 N. J. Eq. 185 (1872); Clement v. Mattison, 37 S. C. L. (3 Rich. L.)
93 (1846); see: Anderson v. Hicks, 15o App. Div. 289, X34 N. Y. S. ioi8 (2d Dep't 1912); McCleary v.
Barcalow, 6 Ohio C. C. 48X, 3 Ohio Dec. 547 (i89i); Imhoff v. Witmer's Adm'r, 3X Pa. St. (7
Casey) 243 (i858); and consult Note, 34 L. R. A. 87 (1905).
14 1 BuRR IV. JONES, THE LAw OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES 104, §59 (4 th ed. 1938); and see: Wood-
worth v. Woodworth, 271 Mass. 398, 171 N. E. 431 (930); Powell v. Powell, 27 Miss. 783 (1854).
1 i BURR W. JoNas, TsE LAw oF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES 150-151, §86 (4th ed. 1938); and see:
Flynn v. Troesch, 373 IIl. 275, 26 N. E. 2d 91 (1940); Castor v. Davis, 12o Ind. 231, 22 N. E. 1io
(1889); Langdon v. Langdon, 204 Ind. 321, 183 N. E. 400 (1932); Note, 67 U. S. L. REv. 271 (933).
1 8 Flynn v. Troesch, 373 Ill. 275, 26 N. E. 2d 91 (1940); Woodworth v. Woodworth, 271 Mass.
398, 171 N. E. 431 (1930); Banker v. Banker, 63 N. Y. 409 (1875); De ]a Montanya v. De ]a Mon-
tanya, 131 Ore. 23, 281 Pac. 825 (1929); Nonnemacher v. Nonnemacher, 159 Pa. 634, 28 Ad. 439 (1894);
but see Weinberg v. Weinberg, 255 App. Div. 366, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 341 (4 th Dep't 1938).
" In addtion to direct statements to that effect in the cases cited in the three preceding footnotes, this
rule is applied in the group of cases cited in note ax supra.
"But this contract is so important in its consequences, the rights, duties, obligations and responsi-
bilities which it creates and imposes are of so delicate and important a character, involving not only
the happiness, well-being and respectability of the parties themselves, but also the honor and peace of
families, that the policy of the law requires courts of justice to sustain and uphold it, unless the proof
be entirely clear and satisfactory, leaving no reasonable doubt upon the mind of the incapacity of the
party and the consequent invalidity of the marriage." Ward v. Dulaney, 23 Miss. 410, 414 (1852).
" It should be here noted that epilepsy, which is, of course, a mental disease, is treated in law, where
its existence does affect the capacity to marry, as a lack of physical and not of mental capacity.
In a few jurisdictions, laws exist against the marriage of "feebleminded" persons, except where the
woman is over the age of forty-five. Such laws have been held to be matters of eugenics rather than
of capacity to assent to marry, and are not among the rules here under discussion. Consult: Lau v. Lau,
81 N. H. 44, 122 At. 345 (r923); Schoolcraft v. O'Neil, 81 N. H. 240, 123 At. 828 (1924).
"Consult the cases cited, infra, notes 20 and 23; and see Barber v. People, 203 II. 543, 68 N. E.
93 (1903).
"°Smith v. Smith, 47 Miss. 211 (1872); Slais v. Slais, 9 Mo. App. 96 (i88o); Kern v. Kern, 51
N. J. Eq. 574, 26 Ad. 837 (1893); Brainen v. Brainen, 79 N. J. Eq. 270, 82 Ad. 327 (x902); Banker
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which permit inquiry into the party's state over a relatively wide period of time,
such an adjudication is normally admissible for whatever inferences may be drawn
from it. 1 But where there has been an adjudication of general insanity prior to
the marriage, and that adjudication still stands at the date of the marriage, the one
who would attack validity can then rely on the presumption that a condition once
shown to exist continues2 2 and proof of such an adjudication will make out a prima
facie, but a rebuttable, case of incapacity to marry.23 That such a presumption should
be a rebuttable one follows logically from the rule, previously discussed, 24 that
capacity to marry depends on the ability to understand the marriage contract and not
necessarily on the ability to do commercial business. In addition, the policy of sus-
taining as valid all apparent marriages so far as possible leads the courts to give an in-
creased credence to the argument that there had been an improvement in mental
state between the date of adjudication and the date of marriage.
At common law, and generally today. except where statutory provisions have
effected a different rule,2" the marriage of one lacking in mental capacity was treated
as totally void, and thus open to collateral attack and to attack after the death of
either party2 6 However, this common law rule exists now in only a few jurisdic-
v. Banker, 63 N. Y. 409 (1875); Forman v. Forman, 24 N. Y. S. 917, 53 N. Y. St. Rep. 639 (Sup. Ct.
1893); Meekins v. Kinsella, 152 App. Div. 32, 136 N. Y. S. 8o6 (Ist Dep't 1912); Nonncmacher v.
Nonnemacher, 159 Pa. 634, 28 At. 439 (1894).
212 JoHiN H. WIGMoRE, A TREATISE ON TE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
CoMMuoN LAW 25, §233; 5 id. at 678-679, §671.
22 9 id. at 461, §2530.
2" Castor v. Davis, 220 Ind. 23r, 22 N. E. ilo (x889); Langdon v. Langdon, 204 Ind. 322, 183
N. E. 400 (1932), discussed in Note, 67 U. S. L. REV. 272 (1933); Gellert v. Busman's Adm'r, 239
Ky. 328, 39 S. W. 2d 512 (1931); Smith v. Smith, 47 Miss. 212 (1872); Parkinson v. Mills, 172 Miss.
784, 159 So. 651 (1935); Payne v. Burdette, 84 Mo. App. 332 (9oo); Weinberg v. Weinberg, 255
App. Div. 366, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 341 (4 th Dep't 2938), discussed in Note, 8 FORD. L. REv. 273 (2939);
McCleary v. Barcalow, 6 Ohio C. C. 481, 3 Ohio Dec. 547 (1892); Ross v. Ross, 175 Okla. 663, 54
P. 2d 6i (1936); Nonnemacher v. Nonnemacher, 259 Pa. 634, 28 At. 439 (1894); Keys v. Norris,
27 S. C. Eq. (6 Rich. Eq.) 388 '(1854); Roether v. Roether, 18o Wis. 24, 191 N. W. 576 (1923).
It is stated in Strahorn, Void and Voidable Marriages in Maryland and Their Annulment, 2 MD.
L. REv. 212, 242-244 (2938), that, in Maryland, by virtue of the continued effect of 15 GEo. II, c.
30, marriages of adjudicated lunatics are totally void by the mere force of the adjudication.
" Cf. especially the cases cited in note 5, supra.
2 Consult Notes, L.R.A. 19i6C 700 (2916); 25 L.R.A. 8oo (1905); 15 Am. Dec. 368 (292o); and
consult: Strahorn, Void and Voidable Marriages in Maryland and Their Annulment, 2 MD. L. REv.
2X, 242-244 (2938).
The wide variety of statutory provisions on the subject are collected and analyzed in I CHESTER
G. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 288-296, §41 (2932).
25 Sothern v. United States, 12 F. 2d 936 (D. Ark. 2926), discussed in Note, 36 YALE L. J. 577
(1927); Rawdon v. Rawdon, 28 Ala. 565 (1856); Sibley v. Kennedy, 224 Ala. 354, 140 So. 552 (1932);
Williams v. Williams, 83 Colo. 18o, 263 Pac. 725 (1927); Kuehmsted v. Turnwall, I2 Fla. 2280, 238
So. 775 (2932); Bell v. Bennett, 73 Ga. 784 (x884); Medlock v. Merritt, Io Ga. 212, 29 S. E. 185
(2897); Orchardson v. Cofield, 171 Ill. 14, 49 N. E. 197 (897); Pyott v. Pyott, 591 Ill. 28o, 61 N. E.
88 (29o), but cf. Barber v. People, 203 Ill. 543, 68 N. E. 93 (1903) (intoxication makes marriage
only voidable, not void); Wiley v. Wiley, 75 Ind. App. 456, 123 N. B. 252 (2929); Langdon v.
Langdon, 204 Ind. 321, 183 N. E. 400 (1932), discussed in Note, 8 IND. L. J. 445 (1933), but cf.
Bruns v. Cope, 182 Ind. 289, 2o5 N. E. 472 (2924), which presumably is no longer good law; Floyd
County v. Wolfe, 138 Iowa 749, 227 N. W. 32 (x9o8); Powell v. Powell, 18 Kan. 371, 26 Am. Rep.
774 (2877); Jenkins v. Jenkins' Heirs, 2 Dana 202, 26 Am. Dec. 437 (Ky. 2833); Johnson v. Sands,
245 Ky. 529, 53 S. W. 2d 929 (2932); Inhab. of Unity v. Inhab. of Belgrade, 76 Me. 429 (1884);
Inhab. of St. George v. City of Biddeford, 76 Me. 593 (1885); Inhab. of Middleborough v. Inhab. of
Rochester, 12 Mass (12 Tyng) 363 (2815); Ward v. Dulaney, 23 Miss. 410 (1852); Guthery v. Ball,
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tions? 7  In a few states, express prohibitions on collateral attack exist;2  in others,
206 Mo. App. 570, 228 S. W. 887 (1921), but cf. Guthery v. Wetzel, 205 Mo. App. 664, 226 S. W. 626
(1g2o); Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343 (N. Y. 1820); Johnson v. Kincade, 37 N. C. (2 Ired.
Eq.) 470 (843); Crump v. Morgan, 38 N. C. (3 Ired. Eq.) 91, 40 Am. Dec. 447 (1843); Waymire
v. Jetmore, 22 Ohio St. 271 (1872); Heath v. Heath, 25 Ohio N. P. [N.S.] 123 (I924), but cf.
McCleary v. Barcalow, 6 Ohio C. C. 481, 3 Ohio Dec. 547 (1891); Newlin's Estate, 231 Pa. 312, 8o
Ad. 255 (1911); Foster, Adm'r v. Means, i Speers' Eq. 569, 42 Am. Dec. 332 (S. C. 1844).
In addition to the eases cited above, in which the courts directly passed on the issue of void versus
voidable marriages, there are a considerable number of cases in which collateral attacks, or attacks after
death, have been permitted without question of the right so to do. Consult: Hagenson v. Hagenson,
258 Ill. 197, ox N. E. 6o6 (913); Flynn v. Troesch, 373 Ill. 275, 26 N. E. 2d 9g1 (1940); Castor v.
Davis, i2o Ind. 231, 22 N. E. x1o (1889); Baughman v. Baughman, 32 Kan. 538, 4 Pac. 1003 (1884);
Gellert v. Busman's Adm'r, 239 Ky. 328, 39 S. W. 2d 5i (93); Inhab. of Atkinson v. Inhab. of
Medford, 46 Me. 51o (1859); Inhab. of Winslow v. Inhab. of Troy, 97 Me. 130, 53 Ad. 7oo8 (19o2);
Banker v. Banker, 63 N. Y. 409 (1875); Nonnemacher v. Nonnemacher, 159 Pa. 634, 28 Atl. 439
(1894); Keys v. Norris, 27 S. C. Eq. (6 Rich. Eq.) 388 (1854).
The decisions in three states suggest some local peculiarities which deserve special mention:
In Georgia, although it was squarely held in Bell v. Bennett, 73 Ga. 784 (1884), that the marriage
of an insane person was void and subject to collateral attack in an action for a widow's allowance,
still, in Crawford v. Crawford, 139 Ga. 535, 77 S. E. 826 (1913), the court permitted a direct suit
for a declaration of nullity, brought by the heirs after death, on the theory that a collateral attack on
the marriage in probate proceedings would not have been permitted.
In Missouri, the court, in Payne v. Burdette, 84 Mo. App. 332 (i9oo), assumed, without argument,
that the marriage was void; then, in Guthery v. Wetzel, 2o5 Mo. App. 664, 226 S. W. 626 (1920), the
court refused to permit a collateral attack on a marriage in a probate proceeding to secure the widow's
appointment as administratrix; but, in a second case involving the same marriage, the same court
allowed a direct suit by the heirs to have the marriage decreed void, distinguishing the earlier ease in
part on the theory that even a void marriage could not be collaterally attacked, though it could be
attacked after death. Guthery v. Ball, 2o6 Mo. App. 570, 228 S. W. 887 (1921).
In North Carolina, the court early declared the marriage of an incompetent to be void. Johnson
v. Kincade, 37 N. C. (2 Ired. Eq.) 470 (1843); Crump v. Morgan, 38 N. C. (3 Ired. Eq.) 91, 4o Am.
Dec. 447 (1843). Twelve years later, in Williamson v. Williams, 56 N. C. 446 (1857), the court
indicated a doubt as to the permissibility of a collateral attack and solved the problem by staying
such a suit pending the bringing and determination of a direct annulment suit. Dictum in State ex rel.
Setzer v. Setzer, 97 N. C. 252, 1 S. E. 558 (1887), again doubted the existence of a right to collateral
attack. This was followed, in 1897, by a short and not too well reasoned opinion, in Sims v. Sims,
121 N. C. 297, 28 S. E. 407 (1897), declaring that, while such marriages were void and could be
attacked after death, still a collateral attack was not to be permitted. The last step is dicta in Watters
v. Watters, x68 N. C. 411, 84 S. E. 703 (1915), where a direct suit for annulment had been brought,
that the marriage was voidable and not void.
"'In seven states (Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Maryland, New Mexico, and Texas) there
is no statute on the subject. i CHESTER G. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMIILY LAws I89, §41 (93). (This
work also lists Louisiana as having no statute, but this is an error. Consult Ducasse's Heirs v. Ducasse,
12o La. 731, 45 So. 565 (19o8), and the statute there construed). Of these seven states, presumably
five retain the common law rule. Eminent authority has stated the rule in Maryland to be that the
marriage of an adjudicated lunatic is totally void, but that the marriage of an unadjudicated lunatic or
incompetent is voidable only. Strahorn, Void and Voidable Marriages in Maryland and Their Annul-
ment, 2 MD. L. REV. 2i, 242-244 (1938). In Texas, although no statute exists, the court has
repudiated the common law rule and adopted the rule of voidability. Carter v. Green, 64 S. W. 2d
1o69 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), expressly declining to follow contrary dicta in Holland v. Riggs, 53 Tex.
Civ. App. 367, 116 S. W. 167 (i909).
Twelve states (Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Utah, and Wyoming), expressly declare such marriages to be "void." How-
ever, the courts in those states have not always taken such declarations literally. The Georgia and
Missouri cases are discussed supra in note 26 to this section. In Nebraska and New Hampshire, the
courts restrict the statutory declaration to the limited class ("lunatics") expressly named in the statutes.
Aldrich v. Steen, 71 Neb. 33, 98 N. W. 445, oo N. ,V. 311 (1904); Lau v. Lau, 81 N. H. 44, 122
Atil. 345 (1923). Only in Michigan and in Wyoming are the statutory declarations sufficiently strong
to make the rule clear in the absence of judicial construction.28 Massachusetts: consult: Inhab. of Goshen v. Inhab. of Richmond, 86 Mass. (4 Allen) 458 (1862);
Woodworth v. Woodworth, 271 Mass. 398, 171 N. E. 431 (930); and North Carolina (but see the
North Carolina cases discussed supra, note 26 to this section).
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procedural statutes on annulment, providing that the marriage of one lacking in
mental capacity shall be void "from the time it is so decreed," or using similar
language, have been construed as making such marriages voidable only;29 in other
states the courts have looked to statutes which, in terms, listed certain marriages as
"void" and, applying the rule of interpretation known as "expressio unius," have
concluded that the marriages of incompetents, not being so listed, were voidable
merely;30 in still other states, the courts have been influenced by the fact that the
statutes on annulment limited either the persons who could bring such suits or the
time within which they could be brought.3
On principle, and apart from the considerations of statutory construction above
discussed, there is much to be said for both rules. In favor of the doctrine of total
voidness, it is urged: (a) that it follows logically from the fact that mental incom-
petency makes impossible the existence of the fundamental essential of marriage-
contractual assent;32 (b) that any other rule opens the door to fraud and abuse, by
upholding a marriage, kept secret during the lifetime of the incompetent, which will
then enrich a designing spouse at the expense of legitimate heirs;33 (c) that, even if
the marriage is attacked directly during the lifetime, the adventurer or adventuress
will secure an illicit advantage through the interim support. Against such argu-
ments, it has been said: (a) that, since mental incompetency is always difficult to
determine, collateral attacks and attacks after the death of a spouse should be barred
in favor of direct attacks, while both spouses are living, with their opportunity for
examination of the claimed incompetent; and (b) that it is socially undesirable to
allow strangers to attack an apparent marriage status, and even more undesirable
to allow a status, accepted without question while the parties thereto were alive, to
be upset ex post facto by persons usually motivated only by a desire to inherit prop-
erty at the expense of the surviving spouse.34
When we turn to the cases involving the "voluntary" character of the consent, ques-
tions of policy become even more apparent than in the cases of "insanity." The cases
of "Duress" are not especially important, since the courts have applied what is, in
"' Arkansas, District of Columbia, Nevada, New York, Oregon, Virginia, and West Virginia.
ThIese statutes are so construed and applied in: Hastings v. Douglass, 249 Fed. 378 (D. W. Va.
1918); Mackey v. Peters, 22 App. D. C. 341 (1903); Henderson v. Ressor, 265 Mo. 718, 178 S. W.
x75, writ of error dismissed, 248 U. S. 536 (1918) (applying the Arkansas statute); Sturgis v. Sturgis,
51 Ore. io, 93 Pac. 696 (19o8); Cornwall v. Cornwall, 16o Va. 183, 168 S. E. 439 (1933).
"
0 Estate of Gregorson, 16o Cal. zi, i6 Pac. 6o (19xi); Dunphy v. Dunphy, x6z Cal. 87, 118 Pac.
445 (igii); Wolf v. Gall, 32 Cal. App. 286, 163 Pac. 346 (91); Mackey v. Peters, 22 App. D. C.
341 (903); Ellis v. Ellis, 152 Miss. 836, 19 So. 304 (1928), discussed in Note, 77 U. op PA. L. Rav.
813 (1929); White v. Williams, 154 Miss. 897, 124 So. 64 (1929), affd. on second appeal, '159 Miss.
732, 132 So. 573 (1931), discussed in Note, 29 Micu. L. REV. xo89 (1931); In re DcConza's Estate,
13 N. J. Misc. 41, 176 Ad. z92 (1934); Stuckey v. Mathes, 24 Hun 461 (N. Y. 1881); Ross v. Ross,
175 Okla. 663, 54 P. 2d 6i (1936); Wiser v. Lockwood's Estate, 42 Vt. 720 (487o).
" Consult, inter alia: Estate of Gregorson, 16o Cal. 21, ix6 Pac. 6o (1911); Hoadley v. Hoadley,
244 N. Y. 424, 155 N. E. 728 (927).
"Consult: Jenkins v. Jenkins' Heirs, 2 Dana 102, 26 Am. Dec. 437 (Ky. 1833).
a" Consult: Jaques v. The Public Adm'r, i Bradf. 499 (N. Y. 1851).
"The best discussions of the arguments against the rule of total voidness are in: White v. Williams,
154 Miss. 897, 124 So. 64 (1929), afi'd on second appeal, 159 Miss. 732, 132 So. 573 (93), discussed
in'Note, 29 Micii. L. REV. 1089 (1931); Carter v. Green, 64 S. W. 2d io69 (Teoc. Civ. App. 1933).
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essence, the same concept as they use for any contract case. But when the apparent
consent was obtained by fraud, we come squarely against deep-seated ideas. As we
all know, the English courts apply a concept of "Caveat Suitor" so firmly that annul-
ment for fraud, in our American sense, is unknown in that country.35 In the United
States, the policy considerations vary from the extreme liberalism of the New York
courts, to the ultra-conservatism of Massachusetts. It is, however, safe to say that
-at least outside of New York-the American courts universally apply in annulment
cases an objective rather than a subjective standard of fraud. The classic phraseology
is that fraud, to be ground for annulment, must go to the "essentials" of marriage-
i.e., that it must affect the possibility of normal marital cohabitation. The case law
has come to make the meaning of this concept rather specific. Concealed pregnancy
by another man (at least in the absence of pre-marital intercourse with the plaintiff),
concealment of venereal disease, or of sterility, and a concealed intent not to permit
normal intercourse or to maintain a normal home-these represent, for practical
purposes, the limits of essential fraud. False claims of pregnancy, concealment of
previous bad character, or of ill-health, lack of love and affection-these, except in rare
and extreme instances, will afford no ground for relief. 6
II
CAPACITY TO MARRY
As has been said above, the cases that fall under this heading involve not the
law of annulment, but the law of marriage. It is the latter law which determines
the age for marriage, the effect of blood relationship, of race, of impotency and
sterility, of disease, and of previous marital status. Once the policy decisions on
those points have been made, the rules which refuse to allow parties to violate
this policy follow almost automatically.
III
CRITIQUE
In two places, it seems to me, there is room for real debate over the general
American doctrines. One is over the general willingness to treat many of the rules
relative to capacity-such as disease and non-age especially-as merely directory pre-
requisites to the issuance of a license and the consequent refusal to annul a marriage
if, by hook or by crook, the party had procured a license from some indifferent or
venal licensing officer. The other is the strict adherence to the concept of "essential"
fraud.
The doctrine of "directory" provisions is the result of two things-first, the tra-
ditional attitude of an older time, that all statutory formalities were to be regarded
as directory, and, second, the accident of legislative draftsmanship which expressed
"Moss v. Moss (1897) P. 263, 66 L. J. P. 154, 77 L. T. 220, 45 W. R. 635, 13 T. L. R. 459,
discussed in Note, 41 SOL. J. 556 (897).
8I have discussed the law of annulment for fraud, and its illustrations, at some length in another
article-Kingsley, Fraud as a Ground for Annulment of a Marriage, 18 So. CALIF. L. REV. 213 (945).
I have not repeated the full documentation here.
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so much of our policy decisions concerning capacity for marriage in the form of
prerequisites for a license. While common law marriage is steadily disappearing,
the courts have not shown any tendency to depart from the subordinate canons of
interpretation first created in order to promote the informal marriage. Probably,
after so long a time, we cannot really expect the courts to reverse themselves on such
matters. And yet, if we really want to prevent the immature and the diseased from
contracting marriage, it would seem that something more than a pious injunction
-avoidable by evasion at the counter of the license bureau-was required. But
legislatures still go on, adding statutory requirements for certificates of freedom
from serious disease, but, in the face of 150 years of statutory interpretation, placing
these new provisions only in the sections on license prerequisitesl
The rules about essential fraud on the other hand cannot be attributed to legis-
lative action. They are court-created and court-administered in their entirety. But
here, and for this very reason, the propriety of change is less clear. We would
scarcely want a system in which every disappointed lover could slip out from under
his or her marital responsibilities. Some recognition must be given to traditions
of a courtier's self-adulation. Whatever a strict ethics may think of it, the idea of
the "white lie" between prospective spouses is too old for a realistic legislator to
ignore. In large part, the urge in textual writing for easier fraud annulments stems
from a general modern unwillingness to take anything but the easiest way. Un-
doubtedly, the modern view which refuses to penalize the husband saddled with
another man's child merely because of his own pre-marital incontinence37 is a wise
relaxation, and much could be said for relief for the unfortunate spouse who has
been tricked into marriage, against strong religious conviction, with a divorced
person."8 But, in general, it does not seem very desirable to consider seriously much
change in the law of annulment for fraud.
CONCLUSION
In short, the grounds for annulment, as recognized in the United States gen-
erally, seem to be logical and reasonably practical, with the exception of the curious
reluctance to afford sanctions for the evasion of positive policy-based rules on
capacity for marriage. These rules, it is submitted, should be made effective, by
express statutory provision, for the annulment of marriages contracted in violation
of their terms.
"'Cf. Arno v. Arno, 265 Mass. 282, 163 N. E. 861 (1928), discussed in Notes, 42 HAPuv. L. REv.
io8i (1929), 9 B. U. L. Ruv. 56 (1929), and x5 VA. L. REv. 387 (x929); Gard v. Gard, 204 Mich.
255, z69 N. W. 908 (x98), discussed in Note, 28 YA.E L. J. 56 (1919).
8 Cf. Oswald v. Oswald, 146 Md. 313, 126 At. 81 (1924); Wells v. Talham, x8o Wis. 654, 194
N. W. 36 (1923).
